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ESSAY
AT THE FRONTIER OF THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE:
REFLECTIONS ON GOOGLE V. HOOD
Gil Seinfeld *
INTRODUCTION

O

N December 19, 2014, long-simmering tensions between Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood and the search engine giant
Google boiled over into federal court when Google filed suit against the
Attorney General to enjoin him from bringing civil or criminal charges
against it for alleged violations of the Mississippi Consumer Protection
Act. 1 Hood had been investigating and threatening legal action against
Google for over a year for its alleged failure to do enough to prevent its
search engine, advertisements, and YouTube website from facilitating
public access to illegal, dangerous, or copyright protected goods. 2 The
case has garnered a great deal of media attention, 3 and with good reason.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I’m grateful to Leah Litman and
Brian Willen for reading and commenting on drafts of this Essay and to Sam Bagenstos and
Debra Chopp for helpful conversations about the subject matter. Sommer Engels and Matt
Evans provided stellar research assistance.
1
Complaint at 32, Google, Inc. v. Hood, No. 14-CV-981 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 19, 2014).
2
Jimmie Gates, Hood: AGs May Battle Web Giant Google, Clarion Ledger, June 6, 2013,
available at 2013 WLNR 14011192; Matea Gold & Tom Hamburger, Google Faces New Pressure From States to Crack Down on Illegal Online Drug Sales, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/google-faces-new-pressure-from-states-to-crackdown-on-illegal-online-drug-sales/2014/04/15/6dfc61fa-be6d-11e3-b195-dd0c1174052c_
story.html.
3
See, e.g., Dana Liebelson, Google Sues Mississippi Attorney General, Alleging Internet
Censorship, Huffington Post, Dec. 19, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/19/

14
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It raises important questions about Internet service providers’ responsibility for serving as a conduit to potentially dangerous or illegal goods,
and it could have significant ramifications for the balance of power between the federal government and the states when it comes to regulating
entities like Google.
With the first round of procedural wrangling now in full swing, the
case reads like something out of a Federal Courts syllabus. Thus, the
parties have joined issue on the question whether the Younger doctrine
requires the district court to abstain from adjudicating Google’s claims;
whether there is an implied right of action available to Google under
federal law to enjoin enforcement of Mississippi’s consumer protection
laws; and, relatedly, whether the court has jurisdiction over Google’s
claims for declaratory relief. 4 There is even some discussion in the briefs
of the obscure doctrine of complete preemption, 5 though the doctrine is
almost certainly irrelevant to the case, and its appearance in the Attorney
General’s briefing is rather contrived.
What is not contrived, however, is the Younger abstention issue, and
it is on that aspect of the case that this Essay will focus. Google filed its
federal court lawsuit approximately six weeks after Attorney General
Hood served it with a subpoena demanding information pertaining to
Google’s policies and practices relating to websites, YouTube videos, or
advertisements that promote what the subpoena labels “Illegal Content”
or “Dangerous Content.” 6 Younger, of course, prohibits federal courts
from interfering with a variety of ongoing state judicial proceedings, 7
and Hood has argued that the issuance of an administrative subpoena,

google-internet-censorship_n_6354518.html; Eric Lipton & Conor Dougherty, Sued by
Google, a State Attorney General Retreats, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 2014, at B2; Rolfe Winkler,
Google Sues Mississippi Over Campaign to Restrict Searches, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-sues-mississippi-over-campaign-to-restrict-searches1419031558.
4
See infra note 18.
5
Attorney General Jim Hood’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint
Based on Jurisdiction and Other Grounds at 20–21, Google, Inc. v. Hood, No. 14-CV-981
(S.D. Miss. Jan. 12, 2015) [hereinafter AG Motion to Dismiss].
6
Administrative Subpoena and Subpoena Duces Tucem at 32–34, Google, Inc. v. Hood,
No. 14-CV-981 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 2014).
7
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971) (holding that federal courts must abstain
from enjoining ongoing state criminal proceedings); infra notes 21–23 (citing cases extending the holding of Younger to non-criminal cases).
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without more, gives rise to an “ongoing proceeding” sufficient to trigger
the Younger bar. 8
This issue—whether Younger requires a federal court to abstain from
hearing a case if state law enforcement officials have already issued a
subpoena running against the federal court plaintiff, but no criminal or
civil action is pending—has divided the lower federal courts. 9 It also
provides a useful vehicle for thinking about Younger more generally by
calling attention to an important feature of the doctrine that is immanent
in the Supreme Court’s post-Younger case law, but is not acknowledged
explicitly. The cases signal, specifically, that federal courts must defer to
state proceedings that are overseen by an impartial state actor—or, at
least, one with a plausible claim to impartiality. Proceedings engineered
and supervised exclusively by a prosecutor will not do. And since the issuance of a subpoena (at least the kind of subpoena at issue in this case)
represents the unilateral act of prosecutorial authorities, it falls outside
the ambit of the Younger doctrine.
I. GOOGLE V. HOOD
A. Factual Background
In December of 2013, twenty-four state Attorneys General signed a
letter to Google’s general counsel admonishing Google for using its
products to “monetiz[e] dangerous and illegal conduct,” enable the sharing and trafficking of content in violation of intellectual property law,
“promot[e] . . . illegal and prescription-free drugs,” and “facilitat[e] . . .
payments to and by purveyors of all of the aforementioned content
through Google’s payment services.” 10 The Attorneys General requested
8

AG Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 31–33.
Compare, e.g., Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177, 1181–82 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that
the issuance of a subpoena by the state Attorney General is sufficient to require abstention
under the Younger doctrine), and Cuomo v. Dreamland Amusements, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 6321,
2008 WL 4369270, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2008) (same), and J. & W. Seligman & Co. v.
Spitzer, No. 05 Civ. 7781, 2007 WL 2822208, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007) (same), with,
e.g., Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 518–19 (1st Cir. 2009) (declining to order abstention despite the issuance of subpoenas by the Office of Insurance Commissioners), and La. Debating and Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483,
1491 (5th Cir. 1995) (similar), and Major League Baseball v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d
1316, 1320, 1321 n.2 (N.D. Fla. 2001) (similar).
10
Letter from State Attorneys General to Kent Walker, General Counsel, Google Inc. (Dec.
10, 2013), available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/correspondence-betweenstate-attorneys-general-and-google/945/.
9
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a meeting with Google to discuss these allegations and, more generally,
“the abuse and presence of content [online] which represents a clear
threat to public health and safety.” 11 Over the ensuing weeks and
months, Attorney General Hood would emerge as Google’s most dogged
critic, repeatedly making public statements accusing Google of illegal
conduct and threatening civil and criminal charges against it. 12
On October 21, 2014, Hood ratcheted up his investigation of Google
by issuing a lengthy subpoena seeking documents and information pertaining to Google’s efforts to police third-party content that users might
access through Google’s search engine and its YouTube website. 13 The
parties negotiated a return date of January 5, 2015; 14 but before that date
arrived, Google shifted to offense. It filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi seeking a declaration
that Google cannot be held liable under Mississippi law for content created by third parties, 15 as well as an injunction against enforcement of
the Attorney General’s subpoena. 16 Judge Wingate promptly stayed enforcement of the subpoena and scheduled a hearing for mid-February. 17

11

Id.
Gold & Hamburger, supra note 2.
See Administrative Subpoena and Subpoena Duces Tucem, supra note 6.
14
AG Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 7.
15
Google’s principal argument is that the Attorney General’s investigation runs headlong
into the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which preempts state and local laws that assign liability to Internet service providers for facilitating users’ access to online content produced by third parties. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Google Inc.’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 15–21, Google, Inc. v.
Hood, No. 14-CV-981 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 19, 2014) [hereinafter TRO Memo]; see also 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (e)(3) (providing that an Internet service provider may not be held liable
as the “publisher or speaker” of third party content under state or local law). Google also
contends that Hood’s investigation violates the First and Fourth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and is preempted by the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. TRO
Memo, supra, at 22–26, 28–29, 31–33.
16
See Complaint, supra note 1. Google’s strategic shift appears to have been motivated by its
discovery that the Motion Picture Association of America was working behind the scenes to
encourage and perhaps even orchestrate state investigations like those pursued by Hood. See
Russell Brandom, Project Goliath: Inside Hollywood’s Secret War Against Google, Verge,
Dec. 12, 2014, http://www.theverge.com/2014/12/12/7382287/project-goliath [hereinafter Project Goliath]; Dana Liebelson, Emails Show Hollywood Worked with a State Attorney General
to Push Its Anti-Piracy Agenda, Huffington Post, Dec. 18, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/12/18/movie-piracy_n_6348256.html; Nick Wingfield & Eric Lipton, Detractors of
Google Take Fight to States, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 2014, at B1.
17
Hayley Tsukayama, Judge Calls a Time-Out in Fight Between Google and Mississippi
Attorney General, Wash. Post, Dec. 23, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the12
13
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B. The Procedural Battle
The Attorney General has since moved to dismiss Google’s lawsuit,
pressing a barrage of claims premised in one way or another on the notion that, if Google wishes to fight the Attorney General’s subpoena, it
must file a motion to quash in state court or wait for Hood to enlist the
state courts’ help in enforcing the subpoena and challenge its validity
then and there. 18 One variation on this argument is premised on the Supreme Court’s decision in Younger v. Harris. 19 That case disables federal courts from enjoining ongoing state court criminal proceedings, 20 and
it has been extended by the Supreme Court to encompass civil enforcement actions, 21 administrative proceedings that are “judicial in nature,” 22
and certain proceedings to protect state court judgments or orders. 23 As
Hood has yet to file an action against Google, however, there is no state
proceeding pending against it at this time (at least not in the conventional sense), and so the case does not fit straightforwardly into any of the
applications of the Younger doctrine that have previously been endorsed
by the Supreme Court.
Hood insists that issuance of the subpoena against Google nevertheless suffices to animate the Younger bar. 24 The subpoena, he argues, is
“part of an ongoing state law investigation” and is “judicial in nature.” 25
It is “an ‘integral part’ of a potential proceeding against [the Plaintiff],”
and so the policies underlying Younger apply with full force. 26 Google
switch/wp/2014/12/23/judge-calls-a-time-out-in-fight-between-google-and-mississippiattorney-general.
18
AG Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 3. The Attorney General argues, in particular,
that the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over Google’s claims, id. at 9–23, that
Google failed to state a justiciable claim under the First Amendment, id. at 23–29, that
Google’s claims are unripe, id. at 39–40, and (as discussed at length here) that Google’s
claims are barred by the Younger doctrine, id. at 30–39.
19
401 U.S. 37 (1977).
20
401 U.S. at 53–54.
21
See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443–44 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S.
592, 604 (1975).
22
See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 625–29
(1986); Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 433–34
(1982).
23
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12–14 (1987); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,
333–36 (1977).
24
AG Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 31–33.
25
Id. at 31.
26
Id. at 32 (quoting J. & W. Seligman & Co. v. Spitzer, No. 05 Civ. 7781, 2007 WL
2822208, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007)).
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rejects this view. It argues that the subpoena is simply a “pre-litigation
investigative tool” and not the sort of civil proceeding deemed by the
Court to fall within the ambit of Younger. 27
II. AT THE FRONTIER OF THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE
The question presented by Google v. Hood is easy enough to state:
Does the issuance of an administrative subpoena by a state Attorney
General prior to the filing of any enforcement action qualify as an “ongoing state proceeding” sufficient to trigger the Younger bar? The answer, however, is not so simple. There is some temptation to say that the
question is straightforwardly empirical—that, at any given time, we can
simply observe whether a state proceeding is up and running, and answer the Younger question from there. But of course this requires a
working definition of the term “proceeding”—so that we know just what
it is we are supposed to be observing—and the term is hardly selfdefining. We might say, for example, that a “proceeding” requires the
filing of some kind of formal complaint or charge, in which case the
mere issuance of an investigative subpoena, without more, would not
qualify. 28 But we might also reason, following Attorney General Hood, 29
that investigative work is a crucial part of any enforcement action, and
that the issuance of a subpoena should therefore be taken as a sign that a
“proceeding” is in fact underway. Both of these accounts are plausible,
and so it seems unlikely that we’ll get meaningful traction on the question that concerns us here by way of generalized reflection on what does
and does not count as a “proceeding.”
The Supreme Court’s post-Younger decisions, meanwhile, do not address the question—at least not directly. There is a long line of cases
stretching from Younger itself to the recent decision in Sprint Communi-

27
Consolidated Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and
in Rebuttal to Defendant’s Response to Google’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction at 12–15, Google, Inc. v. Hood, No. 14-CV-981 (Jan. 22, 2015).
Google also argued that Younger abstention is not warranted because its claim of preemption
under the Communications Decency Act (CDA) is “facially conclusive” and because the
case falls within the exception to the Younger doctrine for circumstances in which a state
prosecutor has acted in bad faith. Id. at 15–18. I will not address these arguments here.
28
Some lower federal courts lean toward this position. See, e.g., Telco Commc’n, Inc. v.
Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir. 1989); Monaghan v. Deakins, 798 F.2d 632, 637
(3d Cir. 1986).
29
See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
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cations v. Jacobs 30 expounding on the contours of the abstention doctrine, but the decisions tend to focus on the question of what type of proceedings merit Younger deference. 31 The question of when such a proceeding begins—of when we can say that it is “ongoing” for Younger
purposes—has not garnered meaningful attention.
If we examine the cases closely, however, and focus on the policy
considerations motivating some of the line-drawing we see, we can identify principles that speak to the question in Google v. Hood. Collectively, the cases suggest that only proceedings of a certain sort—those presided over by an impartial state actor—merit deference under the
Younger doctrine. And if that’s right, then a proceeding is not “ongoing”
for Younger purposes until such time as it has been turned over to an
impartial state official or, at least, an impartial state actor is able to exercise meaningful oversight authority. The administrative subpoena at issue in the Google litigation was issued on the say-so of state prosecutors—without any intervention by a state judge or other neutral officer—
and so abstention seems unwarranted.
A. Investigative Activity and Available State Court Proceedings
Before delving into Supreme Court decisions focused generally on the
matter of Younger deference, it is worth examining lower federal court
decisions addressed to the specific question that concerns us here:
whether Younger kicks in upon the issuance of an administrative subpoena by state prosecutorial authorities. As noted above, 32 the federal
courts are divided on the issue. Some reason that the issuance of a sub-

30

134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013).
See id. (declining to extend Younger to cases involving pending civil actions between
private parties); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S.
350, 368 (1989) (refusing to extend Younger to cases involving pending state proceedings to
review the legitimacy of state legislative or executive action); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
481 U.S. 1, 12–14 (1987) (applying Younger to prevent federal interference with a state
court judgment); Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619,
625–29 (1986) (administrative proceedings); Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State
Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432–34 (1982) (same); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 333–36
(1977) (civil contempt proceedings); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443–44 (1977)
(civil enforcement proceedings); Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 603–05 (1975) (same);
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460–62 (1974) (abstention not required when there is no
prosecution pending against the federal plaintiff).
32
See supra note 9.
31
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poena “suffice[s] to initiate an ongoing state proceeding,” 33 while others
insist that investigation of this sort is “too preliminary . . . to constitute a
‘proceeding’ triggering Younger.” 34 Regardless of which side they take,
however, the cases tend simply to assert that the issuance of a subpoena
by prosecutors (or some other investigative move) either does or does
not count as an ongoing proceeding. Sometimes they take the added step
of reasoning by analogy to the array of Supreme Court decisions extending Younger outside the criminal realm. But what they do not do is explain why it might make sense (or not) to treat the issuance of a subpoena as sufficient to trigger Younger.
One opinion from the Southern District of New York, which concludes that Younger does apply in these circumstances (and on which
Attorney General Hood relies extensively), 35 makes a partial attempt at
explanation:
Although the contested subpoenas are not part of a criminal proceeding, they were issued by the Attorney General pursuant to an investigation of Plaintiffs’ allegedly illegal activities, and the information
sought may be used to initiate civil or criminal proceedings against
Plaintiffs. . . . They are an integral part of a potential proceeding
against Plaintiffs, and without such subpoenas, the Attorney General
33
Cuomo v. Dreamland Amusements, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 6321, 2008 WL 4369270, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2008); see also Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177, 1182 (8th Cir. 1981)
(finding that “[t]he issuance of [a] subpoena[] . . . is part of a state proceeding”); J. & W.
Seligman & Co. v. Spitzer, No. 05 Civ. 7781, 2007 WL 2822208, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,
2007) (finding that “Younger’s ‘ongoing proceeding’ requirement was clearly satisfied when
a state agency . . . issued subpoenas, even though no formal charges had been filed” (internal
quotations omitted)); Hip-Hop Summit Action Network v. N.Y. Temp. State Comm’n on
Lobbying, No. 03 Civ. 5553, 2003 WL 22832569, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2003) (same).
There are also a handful of cases holding that the initiation of investigative work by a grand
jury or the issuance of a search warrant suffice to trigger the Younger bar. See, e.g., Tex.
Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 520–21 (5th Cir. 2004); Kingston v. Utah Cnty., No.
97-4000, 1998 WL 614462, at *4 (10th Cir. 1998); Craig v. Barney, 678 F. 2d 1200, 1201–
02 (4th Cir. 1982); Mirka United, Inc. v. Cuomo, No. 06 Civ. 14292, 2007 WL 4225487, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007); Nick v. Abrams, 717 F. Supp. 1053, 1056 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
34
Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 519 (1st Cir. 2009); see also
Major League Baseball v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1320 (N.D. Fla. 2001) (finding that “no state criminal or civil proceeding [was] pending” despite the fact that the state
Attorney General had issued civil investigative demands to plaintiffs prior to their filing in
federal court). Some lower federal courts insist that some formal enforcement action beyond
mere investigation—such as the filing of a formal complaint or charge—is necessary for
Younger to apply. See, e.g., ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 127, 140 (3d Cir.
2014); cases cited supra note 28.
35
AG Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 32–33.
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seldom could amass the evidence necessary to commence fraud actions. 36

The difficulty with this analysis is that nearly all investigative activity
by attorneys general could be characterized as “an integral part of a potential proceeding;” and it is routinely the case that information sought
by state officials in the course of an investigation could be used to initiate a civil or criminal action. Yet it is clear that if a state prosecutor
launches an investigation into possibly unlawful conduct, but restricts
that investigation to things like conversations with the target, interviews
with third parties, and informal requests for documents and information,
Younger will not come into play.
This is evident from the Supreme Court’s decision in the foundational
case of Steffel v. Thompson. 37 That case holds that Younger poses no obstacle to a federal court plaintiff securing a declaration as to the constitutionality of state law so long as there is no prosecution pending against
the plaintiff in state court. 38 In Steffel itself, the plaintiff was permitted to
proceed with his federal court action for declaratory relief despite the
fact that police officers had repeatedly investigated his allegedly unlawful conduct (distributing leaflets on a sidewalk outside a shopping center) and, indeed, threatened him with arrest. 39 In fact, plaintiffs filing
Steffel-style actions for declaratory relief routinely call attention to investigative activity by state law enforcement officials in order to demonstrate that their cases satisfy the constraints of the ripeness doctrine. 40
And courts are hardly in the habit of dismissing these cases on the
ground that such investigation is “an integral part of a potential proceeding” sufficient to trigger the Younger bar. 41
36

J. & W. Seligman & Co., 2007 WL 2822208, at *5 (internal quotations omitted).
415 U.S. 452 (1974).
38
Id. at 462.
39
Id. at 455. A companion of Steffel had in fact been arrested and charged with violating
state law for the same leafleting activity Steffel wished to engage in. Id. at 455–56.
40
See, e.g., Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 601, 605–06, 609–10 (6th Cir. 2014); Cooksey v.
Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 231–32, 239–41 (4th Cir. 2013).
41
And how could they be? If investigations of this sort sufficed to animate the Younger
bar, Steffel would be reduced to a virtual dead letter. In many cases, it will be difficult to
show ripeness without showing some evidence of prosecutorial interest (which is to say,
without providing evidence of some “investigation”), and it would be impossible, then, to
avoid dismissal under Younger.
In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Court suggested that Younger applies not only to pending prosecutions, but to prosecutions that are “about-to-be-pending.” 504 U.S. 374,
381–82 n.1 (1992). And some lower federal courts have called attention to this language.
37

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2015]

At the Frontier of the Younger Doctrine

23

Given Steffel, the argument for abstaining in a case like Google v.
Hood seems weak. It is clear that routine investigative activity by state
law enforcement officials will not cause the Younger bar to kick in, and
it is difficult to see why application of the doctrine should be contingent
on whether an investigation happens to entail use of the subpoena power. It is no answer to say that, with the issuance of a subpoena, the target
of an investigation has access to a state court proceeding—initiated by a
motion to quash—through which objections to the investigation might
be ventilated. 42 For it is equally true, at least in most cases, that the target of an investigation that does not include use of the subpoena power
has access to a state court proceeding—an action for declaratory or injunctive relief—through which she might raise objections to the investigation. 43
Here too, Steffel is telling. The Court in that case did not stop to inquire whether the federal plaintiff might have pressed his constitutional

See, e.g., Kingston v. Utah Cnty., No. 97-4000, 1998 WL 614462, at *4 (10th Cir. 1998);
Mirka United, Inc,. v. Cuomo, No. 06 Civ. 14292, 2007 WL 4225487, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
27, 2007). This is noteworthy because it suggests that one can have an “ongoing” proceeding
prior to the formal initiation of an enforcement action, and that, in turn, suggests that investigation alone might suffice to trigger the Younger bar. But the key passage from Morales is
footnote dictum, and it finds no support in prior or subsequent decisions of the Supreme
Court. Certainly the Court has never ordered abstention under the Younger doctrine in a case
that did not involve an action formally pending before some state court or administrative
body. Second, even if the imminence of a state court prosecution sufficed to trigger Younger,
the question would remain whether Younger applies to cases in which state prosecutors have
issued subpoenas but still no prosecution is imminent.
42
Hood leans heavily on this point in his Motion to Dismiss, AG Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 5, at 5, 34–35, and lower federal court decisions ordering abstention in light of the issuance of administrative subpoenas focus intently on the availability of state court proceedings
to challenge the investigation. See, e.g., Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177, 1182 (8th Cir.
1981) (“The issuance of the subpoenas, under Arkansas law, is part of a state proceeding in
which the plaintiffs to this action had an opportunity to present their claims. Challenges to
such subpoenas can be made by a motion to quash in the state circuit courts . . . .”); Hip-Hop
Summit Action Network v. N.Y. Temp. State Comm’n on Lobbying, No. 03 Civ. 5553, 2003
WL 22832569, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2003) (similar). The heavy emphasis on the availability of state court proceedings is a reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Middlesex
County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, which treats the issue as an essential
part of the inquiry into whether Younger abstention is required. 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sprint Communications v. Jacobs, however, admonishes lower courts not to treat the conditions identified in the Middlesex case as dispositive.
134 S. Ct. 584, 593 (2013).
43
See, e.g., Miss. R. Civ. P. 57(a) (“Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions
may declare rights, status, and other legal relations regardless of whether further relief is or
could be claimed.”).
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claims in some state court action for declaratory or injunctive relief. It
was enough to refuse abstention that the federal court plaintiff was not
party to an ongoing state court action in which those claims might have
been raised. 44 Nor, in the decades since Steffel was decided, have the
lower federal courts endorsed the view that the availability of declaratory or injunctive relief in some yet-to-be-initiated state court action suffices to render abstention appropriate. The cases reflect the contrary
view that it is one thing to say that a state court proceeding is available
and another to say, as the Younger doctrine requires, that such a proceeding is ongoing.
B. Investigative Proceedings That Are “Judicial in Nature”
Despite all of this, federal courts are sometimes required to abstain in
light of the pendency of state proceedings that include a significant investigative component. Thus, in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v.
Garden State Bar Association, the Court held that a federal court challenge to the constitutionality of New Jersey’s attorney disciplinary rules
was barred because the plaintiff was the subject of a pending disciplinary hearing before the state Ethics Committee. 45 And in Ohio Civil
Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, the Court ordered abstention in light of the pendency of proceedings before the Ohio Civil
Rights Commission. 46 In each of these cases, the administrative proceeding in question involved investigative work similar to the sort a prosecutor might perform prior to initiating a criminal or civil enforcement action; 47 yet the Court resolved to lump these processes—part
investigative, part adjudicative—along with criminal and civil enforcement actions subject to the Younger bar, rather than depositing them in
the Steffel category and exempting them from the abstention requirement.

44

Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462.
457 U.S. at 425, 437.
46
477 U.S. 619, 621–22, 629 (1986).
47
See Dayton Christian Sch., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 766 F.2d 932, 935 (6th
Cir. 1985) (describing investigative work performed by the Civil Rights Commission), rev’d,
477 U.S. 619 (1986); Garden State Bar Ass’n v. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm., 643 F.2d
119, 123 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that the administrative body in question was “authorized to
receive information relating to allegedly unethical conduct by a member of the bar” and to
“inquire into the facts to decide whether a formal complaint should be filed”), rev’d, 457
U.S. 423 (1982).
45
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Middlesex and Dayton have come to stand for the proposition that a
federal court must abstain not only in deference to state criminal and
civil enforcement proceedings, but also in light of the pendency of state
administrative proceedings that are “judicial in nature.” 48 Yet neither
case explains why, exactly, the administrative proceedings at issue were
best regarded as “judicial,” rather than “administrative” or “investigative;” 49 and, more important for present purposes, neither explains why
“judicial in nature” is the barometer of whether Younger applies to an
administrative proceeding. This is unfortunate because it makes it difficult to see exactly what drives the doctrinal move embodied in the two
cases, and that, in turn, makes it more difficult to understand the policies
underlying Younger more generally. As it turns out, moreover, understanding just why it matters that the proceedings in those two cases were
“judicial in nature” can help us get traction on the problem in Google v.
Hood.
Younger famously explained federal courts’ duty to abstain from interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings by reference to considerations of equity, comity, and federalism. 50 Over time, the first of
these considerations (equity) has receded to the background of the
Court’s Younger jurisprudence, 51 while the “more vital consideration[s]” 52 of comity and federalism have assumed center stage. 53 In

48
The phrase appears first in the Middlesex decision, wherein the Court took note of how
the State of New Jersey classified the bar disciplinary proceedings at issue. 457 U.S. at 433.
Dayton Christian Schools flags the point as doctrinally crucial. See 477 U.S. at 627 (“Because we found that the administrative proceedings in Middlesex were ‘judicial in nature’
from the outset, it was not essential . . . [for purposes of the Younger inquiry] that they had
progressed to state-court review by the time we heard the federal injunction case.”(citation
omitted)).
49
In Middlesex, the Court emphasized that the New Jersey Supreme Court treats the relevant administrative body “as the arm of the court” and “considers its bar disciplinary proceedings as ‘judicial in nature.’” 457 U.S. at 433–34. This suggests that the Court was willing, at least to some extent, to outsource the question whether a proceeding is “judicial in
nature” to the states. It seems entirely sensible to treat states’ views on this question as probative. But the question whether a proceeding is “judicial” within the meaning of the Younger doctrine must ultimately be one of federal law. And my point here is simply that Middlesex and Dayton provide little guidance on this score.
50
Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44.
51
See, e.g., Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431–32 (treating comity and federalism as “the policies
underlying Younger”); Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (acknowledging that
“the traditional reluctance of courts of equity . . . to interfere with a criminal prosecution . . .
is not available to mandate federal restraint in civil cases”).
52
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
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fleshing out these principles of comity and federalism, the Court placed
particular emphasis on the interests in avoiding duplicative litigation and
in refraining from casting aspersions on state institutions’ willingness or
capacity to deal fairly with litigants pressing federal constitutional
claims. Thus, in Huffman v. Pursue, the majority emphasized that federal court interference with a pending state civil enforcement action “results in duplicative legal proceedings, and can readily be interpreted ‘as
reflecting negatively upon the state court’s ability to enforce constitutional principles.’” 54 And, in Juidice v. Vail, the Court insisted that federal interference with state contempt proceedings “reflect[s] negatively
upon the state court[s].” 55 Lower federal courts now routinely flag these
considerations as the primary forces motivating the Younger doctrine. 56
The key thing to observe at this point is that the Court has not extended this logic to ordinary investigative activities by state law enforcement
officials. Again, we are back to Steffel. The Court in that case might
have ordered abstention on the ground that when a litigant runs to federal court in the hope of bringing some state investigation to a halt, it “reflects negatively” on state institutions—to wit, the officials pursuing the
investigation (why presume that they will ignore constitutional constraints and bring a prohibited enforcement action?) and the state judiciary as well (why not look to state courts to test the permissibility of state
laws or official action?). 57 But it didn’t. Instead, the Court insisted that
“considerations of equity, comity, and federalism have little vitality”
53
The steady marginalization of the equity-based justification for the Younger rule is
linked to the expansion of the doctrine to cover noncriminal state proceedings. See cases cited supra note 31. The venerable maxim that equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution
could, of course, do no work in cases involving civil or administrative proceedings, and so it
was necessary—if the results in the cases were to be persuasively defended—for the Court to
lean heavily on the comity and federalism rationales.
54
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974)).
55
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 (1977) (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604); see also
Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431 (“Minimal respect for the state processes, of course, precludes
any presumption that the state courts will not safeguard federal constitutional rights.”).
56
See, e.g., Moore v. City of Asheville, 396 F.3d 385, 394–95 (4th Cir. 2005); Coruzzi v.
New Jersey, 705 F.2d 688, 691 (3d Cir. 1983).
57
See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 437 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t can be
argued that whenever a federal court rules on the constitutionality of a state statute, it is making a decision that interferes with the operation of important state mechanisms, and performing a task that could equally be performed by a state court.”). To be clear, Justice Stevens
was not endorsing the view that abstention is appropriate under such conditions. To the contrary, he insisted that, under such circumstances, the affront to principles of comity and federalism is “lesser.” Id.
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when no prosecution is pending against the federal plaintiff. 58 “When no
state criminal proceeding is pending,” the Court explained, “federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption
of the state criminal justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that
circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state
court’s ability to enforce constitutional principles.” 59
These arguments are unpersuasive. To begin with, the Court’s claim
that the species of litigation authorized by its decision “does not result
in . . . disruption of the state criminal justice system” is obviously false.
Indeed, the whole point of the exercise (at least from the plaintiff’s perspective) is to disrupt the state’s criminal justice system. The disruption
may or may not be warranted, but it is disruption either way. 60 The same
goes for the claim that the lawsuits authorized by Steffel do not reflect
negatively on state courts’ ability to enforce constitutional principles. Of
course they do. Indeed, the very existence of federal court jurisdiction in
cases of this sort is an expression of uncertainty as to state courts’ willingness to vindicate federal claims. 61 The point is not that Steffel got the
balance wrong; it’s just that the Court’s justifications are overstated and
oversimplified.
Despite the Justices’ reasoning, then, Steffel is best read not to support
the conclusion that federal court challenges targeted at investigative activity by state prosecutors cast no aspersions on state officials or institutions, but that the casting of such aspersions is not always inconsistent
with our federalism. Cases like Middlesex and Dayton Christian
58

Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462.
Id.
60
See Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power
356 (2d ed. 1990) (“[Steffel] appears to contradict two of the . . . recognized bases of Younger deference—the desire to avoid interference with state substantive legislative policies and
with state prosecutorial discretion. For whether or not a prosecution has been filed, federal
relief tells the prosecutor ‘when and how’—and indeed if—he or she is to bring a prosecution.” (internal citation omitted)).
61
See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (“Congress . . . was concerned
that state instrumentalities could not protect [federal] rights; it realized that state officers
might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights . . . and it believed that these
failings extended to the state courts.”); see also, e.g., The Federalist No. 81, at 486 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (Hamilton justified the channeling of federal
question cases to the federal courts on the ground that “the most discerning cannot foresee
how far the prevalency of a local spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the
jurisdiction of national causes . . . State judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or from
year to year, will be too little independent to be relied upon for an inflexible execution of the
national laws”).
59
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Schools, meanwhile, can help us to see why this is so. The Court’s emphasis in those cases on the question whether state administrative proceedings are “judicial in nature,” together with its refusal in Steffel to bar
declaratory actions targeted at routine investigative activities by state
law enforcement officials, suggests that application of the Younger doctrine is contingent on the formal participation of some impartial state actor in the enforcement and application of state law. Cases like Steffel just
do not fit the bill; nor do administrative proceedings that lack what one
federal court has labeled “trial-like trappings.” 62 Though it is true, of
course, that state prosecutors are officers of the court—duty-bound to
uphold applicable state and federal laws—few would classify them as
impartial actors in the mold of state judges or even in the mold of the officials who perform adjudicative functions for administrative bodies like
those at issue in Middlesex and Dayton Christian Schools. The fact is,
we expect that prosecutors will sometimes press charges and file complaints (and certainly they will investigate) when the law says they
should not; they operate in an institutional setting that conduces to that
result. And so it is no great insult to state prosecutors to cast aspersions
on the evenhandedness of their investigative efforts.
This intuition fully explains the manner in which the cases sort.
Younger, Huffman, Middlesex, and Dayton Christian Schools all involve
state proceedings pending before a state body with a legitimate claim to
impartiality. 63 Steffel does not. The analysis here also suggests that it
was essential to the holdings in Middlesex and Dayton Christian Schools
that the plaintiffs did not file in federal court until after formal proceedings before the state administrative bodies had begun. 64 With the filing
of formal charges in each of those cases, the work of the administrative
62

Telco Commc’ns, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir. 1989) (explaining
when the Middlesex/Dayton rule takes hold).
63
The same holds for Juidice v. Vail and Pennzoil v. Texaco which, as noted earlier, see
supra note 23 and accompanying text, extend the Younger doctrine to proceedings to enforce
state court judgments or orders. In some cases, it will be difficult to determine whether hearing officers presiding over administrative proceedings meet criteria of evenhandedness sufficient to trigger Younger. These tribunals do not come labeled “neutral and evenhanded,” on
the one hand, or “run by flunkies and hacks,” on the other. No doubt this is why some courts,
like the Fourth Circuit in Telco Communications, inquire whether the proceedings in question have “trial-like trappings.” 885 F.2d at 1228.
64
Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. at 624; Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 428–29; see also supra
notes 28, 34 (identifying cases taking the position that the initiation of formal administrative
proceedings, as opposed to more informal investigative ones, is essential to the application
of the Middlesex/Dayton rule).
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body shifted from strictly investigative pursuits to a hybrid of investigation and impartial adjudication. And with that shift, one of the central
policy justifications underlying Younger—avoiding casting aspersions
on impartial state decisionmakers—sprung to life. 65
Finally, this understanding of the Middlesex/Dayton rule finds support
in decisions of the lower federal courts expounding on what it means for
a state administrative proceeding to be “judicial in nature.” The Fourth
Circuit’s decision in Telco Communications v. Carbaugh is illustrative. 66
The court there explained that for an administrative proceeding to be
“judicial in nature,” it must have “trial-like trappings.” 67 And it focused
on the questions whether the administrative body at issue initiated a
formal hearing or requested a formal prosecution; 68 whether meetings
65

The analysis here might also help to explain—though it cannot justify—an interesting
nuance in the lower court case law wrestling with the question of whether pre-filing investigative activity suffices to trigger the Younger bar. If we focus only on cases involving the
issuance of subpoenas by grand juries, or efforts to secure information by way of a search
warrant, the decisions lean heavily toward the view that later-filed federal court challenges
are barred by Younger. See supra note 33. If we focus, instead, on cases involving subpoenas
issued by state law enforcement officials, but neither search warrants nor grand juries, the
cases are fairly evenly split. See supra notes 33–34. There is language in the cases from the
former category suggesting that they swing the way they do because there is at least the patina of judicial oversight in the mix. See, e.g., Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 521
(5th Cir. 2004) (“The grand jury is said to be ‘an arm of the court by which it is appointed.’
The district court impanels the grand jury after testing the qualifications of its members, administers the jurors’ oath, and instructs them as to their duties as grand jurors. The grand jury
can seek advice from the district court on any matter it is considering.” (citations omitted)).
No such argument is available in the context of an ordinary administrative subpoena. Whether this pattern in the lower court case law is defensible would seem to depend on the extent
of judicial oversight over the subpoena- and search-warrant-issuing processes. Only if the
relevant state judicial officer can truly pass judgment on, and perhaps prevent, the relevant
species of investigation does it make sense to say that federal judicial intervention casts aspersions on an impartial state official.
66
885 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1989).
67
Id. at 1228.
68
As noted earlier, see supra note 28 and accompanying text, some courts treat the initiation of formal proceedings as the crucial barometer of when the Younger bar kicks in. This
metric, too, could be used to sort the major Supreme Court cases extending Younger outside
the criminal realm. In many cases, of course, this inquiry and the one I focus on here will
amount to much the same thing. That is, an impartial officer will become involved just as
formal proceedings are initiated. I lean toward the “impartiality” formulation precisely because it seems to yield the sounder result in a case like Google v. Hood. The issuance of a
subpoena would seem to qualify as a relatively formal investigative move. But it is difficult
to see why Younger should attach to such proceedings simply by virtue of their formality. If
it is permissible to “cast aspersions” on state prosecutorial authorities—and Steffel suggests
that it is—why should it become impermissible to do so when the prosecutor has used the
subpoena power?
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held as part of the investigation involved sworn testimony and whether a
record was maintained; whether the target of the investigation was permitted to issue subpoenas and cross examine witnesses; and, crucially,
whether an impartial hearing officer presided over the proceeding. 69
If all this is right, then Hood’s bid for abstention in the Google litigation ought to fail. The administrative subpoena under dispute in that case
was issued at the direction of the Attorney General, without intervention
or screening by a judicial officer or any other arguably neutral state actor. Attorney General Hood is exactly right to argue that Google’s federal court action threatens to “interfere with . . . on-going state . . . proceedings” and “presum[es] that the state courts will not safeguard
federal constitutional rights.” 70 But he is wrong to think this poses any
kind of problem from the perspective of the Younger doctrine. To the
contrary, the cases seem to suggest that this is just what federal courts
are for.

69
Telco, 885 F.2d at 1228; see also, e.g., Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Sanchez-Ramos, 397
F. Supp. 2d 327, 332 (D.P.R. 2005) (“The administrative proceedings that Younger is meant
to protect must provide the parties involved with an opportunity to be heard and to present
their version of the facts before a final determination is made; a neutral fact-finding process.”). To be clear, fixating on the neutrality of the process cannot help to explain all of the
features of the Younger doctrine flagged earlier. Most notably, it cannot support an account
of why the law eschews any requirement that federal claimants exhaust state judicial remedies nor, relatedly, can it help us to understand the Justices’ repeated insistence that even the
pendency of state court proceedings will sometimes not be enough to motivate abstention
under the Younger doctrine. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013)
(“Abstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding involves the
same subject matter.”); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S.
350, 373 (1989) (“[T]here is no doctrine that the availability or even the pendency of state
judicial proceedings excludes the federal courts.”). Those features of the Younger doctrine
are best explained by reference to the potency of the federal interest in providing a forum for
the vindication of federal claims, see supra note 61, and the relative weakness of states’ interest in litigation falling outside the categories of criminal proceedings, civil enforcement
proceedings, and civil proceedings to enforce state court judgments or orders.
70
AG Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 30, 35.

